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SECONDARY LIABILITY OF CONTROLLING PERSONS
UNDER THE SECURITIES ACTS: TOWARD AN
IMPROVED ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
In the securities legislation of both 1933 and 1934, Congress in-
cluded statutory provisions extending liability beyond individuals
"directly" or "primarily" responsible for violations, to a "secondary"
level more remote from the infraction. The legislation places
vicarious responsibility for offenses upon those who "control" vio-
lators. Although analogous to traditional agency or respondeat
superior doctrines, this variety of secondary liability extends beyond
those common law relationships to an amorphous class of individuals
or entities to which Congress gave the name "controlling persons."
The evidence seems to be that a substantial degree of ambiguity was
intentional on the part of the legislature in its design of these
mechanisms,1 and the political climate of the era in which the pro-
visions were conceived was supportive of a powerful and flexible
legal tool to penetrate corporate formalisms. 2
The flexibility embodied in these provisions of the securities
acts also created the potential for judicial misapplication. This
danger was particularly acute when the fluid and difficult concept of
"'control" was applied to business relationships. The availability of
the controlling person provisions as a weapon for the enforcement
of the securities laws offered courts a convenient means by which to
impose liability on a "deep pocket," or seek equitable results.
1 See, e.g., text accompanying note 6 infra.
2 See generally IL DEBEDTS, Tim NEW DEAs'S SEC 1-85 (1964); H.R. REP.
No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933):
The background of the President's message is only too familiar to
everyone. During the post-war decade some 50 billions of new securities
were floated in the United States. Fully half or $25,000,000,000 worth of
securities floated during this period have been proved to be worthless.
These cold figures spell tragedy in the lives of thousands of individuals
who invested their life savings, accumulated after years of effort, in these
worthless securities. The flotation of such a mass of essentially fraudulent
securities was made possible because of the complete abandonment by
many underwriters and dealers in securities of those standards of fair,
honest, and prudent dealing that should be basic to the encouragement of
investment in any enterprise. Alluring promises of easy wealth were freely
made with little or no attempt to bring to the investor's attention those
facts essential to estimating the worth of any security. High-pressure
salesmanship rather than careful counsel was the rule in this most dan-
gerous of enterprises.
(1345)
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The case law in the area of controlling person liability is
plagued by vague holdings, questionable statutory interpretation,
and disregarded distinctions. This Comment will examine these
practical problems and also will explore sources of theoretical con-
fusion. Through a combination of statutory interpretation and case
analysis, it will be argued that a new view of the controlling person
provisions is necessary.
The Comment begins with an explanation of the statutory
sections and major policies of the controlling person provisions.
Following this background discussion, the Comment analyzes the
relationship between these provisions and other vehicles of secondary
liability, concluding that the statutory provisions complement the
common law doctrines of agency and respondeat superior rather than
pre-empt them. The Comment next proposes a two-step analytical
approach to controlling persons actions. Under this approach, the
appropriate analysis involves a status phase, focusing on the control
relationship between the defendant and the primary violator, and a
liability phase, determining whether any of the sections' exculpatory
defenses apply.
Turning to existing case law, the Comment surveys a number
of inconsistencies in court decisions on major issues. This analysis
demonstrates that the preservation of theoretical distinctions on such
issues as the scope of control required for controlling person status,
the necessity for an affirmative act of inducement under the section
20(a) defense, and the directness of control required for control
status, would eliminate the existing confusion on controlling person
issues and improve judicial consistency. The Comment concludes
by suggesting that these provisions are addressed to special instances
of indirect violations of the securities acts, and urges that controlling
person liability should be viewed as a subset of the general liability
in section 20(b) for those who violate the law through others.
II. THE CONTROLLING PERSON STATUTES AS A BASIS FOR SECONDARY
LIABILITY UNDER THE SECURITIEs ACTS
A. The Statutes
Congress initially imposed vicarious statutory liability on con-
trolling persons in section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933. 8 The
section reads as follows:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency,
or otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an
3 Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1970). The final qualifying
clause was added in 1934. See note 25 infra & accompanying text.
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agreement or understanding with one or more other per-
sons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise,
controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this
title, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to
the same extent as such controlled person to any person to
whom such controlled person is liable, unless the control-
ling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to
believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the
liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
Rule 405, promulgated under the 1933 Act, defined the term
"control" for purposes of judicial and administrative construction:
Control. The term "control" (including the terms
"controlling," "controlled by" and "under common control
with") means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the
power to direct or cause the direction of the management
and policies of a person, whether through the ownership
of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.4
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also provided for control-
ling person liability for violations, utilizing a new set of statutory
standards. Section 20(a) states:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any
person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any
rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled
person to any person to whom such controlled person is
liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and
did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts consti-
tuting the violation or cause of action.5
The concept of "control" under the 1934 provision extended
potential liability to a wide range of personal and corporate relation-
ships, as did the 1933 provision. Congress intended to allow broad
and flexible application of the term, as the following excerpt from
a 1934 House Report indicates:
In this section and in section 11, when reference is
made to "control", the term is intended to include actual
control as well as what has been called legally enforceable
control. (See Handy & Harmon v. Burnet (1931) 284 U.S.
136.) It was thought undesirable to attempt to define the
term. It would be difficult if not impossible to enumerate
or to anticipate the many ways in which actual control may
be exerted. A few examples of the methods used are stock
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(f) (1977).
5 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970).
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ownership, lease, contract, and agency. It is well known
that actual control sometimes may be exerted through
ownership of much less than a majority of the stock of a
corporation either by the ownership of such stock alone or
through such ownership in combination with other factors.6
Operating as a unit, the controlling person provisions of the
1933 and 1934 securities acts attempt to allocate liability for statu-
tory violations in accordance with the realities of business relation-
ships.7 Consistent with this intention, the consequences of liability
do not attach because of mere structural or organizational domina-
tion: controlling persons with an apparent connection to a violation
may avoid liability in particular cases on the grounds of good faith
or lack of knowledge or involvement.
B. The Place of the Controlling Person Provisions Among
Vehicles for Secondary Liability for Violations
Congress' decision to make controlling persons liable for viola-
tions of the securities laws parallels judicial efforts to impose second-
ary liability under traditional theories of agency or aiding and
abetting. Because of this similarity, there has been considerable
uncertainty regarding the relationship between the statutory and
common law approaches." The debate has focused upon the extent
to which the statutory provisions represent the exclusive basis for
secondary liability.
Some courts have suggested that the statutes are pre-emptive,
maintaining that the express language of the controlling person pro-
visions precludes the application of common law agency standards
6 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934).
7 The future of controlling person litigation seems assured: the proposed
Federal Securities Code currently contains the following provision:
[Persons liable.] (a) [Controlling persons.] A person who controls
a person liable under this Code (as defined in section 217A), whether that
person is liable directly or by virtue of this section, is liable to the same
extent as the controlled person, unless the controlling person proves (1)
that he was not a controlling person at the time of any of the acts giving
rise to liability, (2) that he did not know, and bad no reasonable ground
to believe, that the controlled person's conduct was unlawful or a breach
of duty, or involved a fraudulent act, a misrepresentation, or nondisclosure
of a fact of special significance (as defined in section 1303(c)) by an
insider (as defined in section 1303(b)), or (3) in the case of section 1413
that he acted in good faith and did not induce the transactions in question;
but a person who controls a person liable under or in connection with
part IXC is not liable by virtue of that fact alone.
AL FED. Smc. CoDE § 1419(a) (Tentative Draft No. 6, April 1, 1977) (brackets
and parentheses in original).
8 See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 48 nn.17, 18
(2d Cir. 1978) (recognition of judicial disharmony on the issue, and the inherent
difficulty of the question).
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of liability.9  An emerging judicial' and scholarly" consensus,
however, indicates that agency doctrines serve to complement the
9 See, e.g., Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); SEC v. Lun's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1061-
63 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). It is notable, however, that a number of the decisions fre-
quently cited as authority for the exclusivity principle fail to support the proposi-
tion. See, e.g., Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975); Lanza
v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar
& Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1967), cert.
dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
The Kamen decision, cited in Zweig and Lum's as controlling authority, has
been misread as supporting exclusivity. The opinion initially gives the impression
that the court applied the defenses of section 15 despite the existence of an agency
relationship. The underlying theme of the court's analysis indicates, however, that
the violation was not within the scope of the agency, making strict liability inap-
plicable. The buying dealer had unreasonably relied upon the agent's authority
because he was on notice that the agent's representations violated exchange rules.
Id. 696. The circuit court, therefore, looked to section 15 only as a potential basis
for liability.
The Lanza opinion has similarly been misconstrued. Because the defendant
security partner had not violated Rule 10b-5 or failed to fulfill his obligations, "the
court did not actually reach the question of whether Drexel [the defendant] had
liability either under respondeat superior . . . or under the controlling persons
sections .... ." Note, The "Controlling Persons" Liability of Broker-Dealers for
Their Employees' Federal Securities Violations, 1974 D=rz L.J. 824, 838 n.81
(1974) [hereinafter cited as "Controlling Persons" Liability].
A third source of judicial misinterpretation is Rochez Bros. The court's state-
ment that "principles of agency, i.e. respondeat superior, are inappropriate to impose
secondary liability in a securities violation case," 527 F.2d at 884, coupled with a
favorable reference to the Kamen rule, imply that the statutory provisions are the
exclusive basis for secondary liability. Id. 885 n.9. Nevertheless, the court ad-
dressed the plaintiff's allegation of agency liability, finding insufficient support for
the claim on the facts. Id. 884. This inconsistency can be resolved, however, if
it is recognized that the court was worried about the misapplication of both the
strict liability standard of agency and the statutory defenses under the controlling
person provisions. When viewed as a whole, it is clear that the reference to section
20(a) as the exclusive statement of vicarious liability is addressed to the situation
in which a relationship satisfies section 20(a) control status, but not agency or
employment.
10 See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 811-13 (2d Cir.
1975); Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1974);
Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974); Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359, 361-63
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); Plunkett v. Dominick &
Dominick, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 885, 887-89 (D. Conn. 1976). See also Sennott v.
Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 926
(1973) (opinion of Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice
Douglas noted: "The purpose of the Act is to expand, not restrict, the public's
remedies." Id. 929. Cf. SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 54-55 (2d
Cir. 1976) (appropriateness of common law agency concepts in some instances does
not justify their use when it will not further the policies of the securities acts).
"'The leading commentator in this field has predicted that the controlling
person statutes will come to be viewed as available only when necessary to impose
liability, thus restricting access to their "special defenses." See Ruder, Multiple
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In
Pan Deicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. BRv. 597, 608
(1972). See also "Controlling Persons" Liability, supra note 9, at 832-38; Comment,
The Controlling Persons Provisions: Conduits of Secondary Liability Under Federal
Securities Law, 19 Vr.. L. REv. 621, 630-31 (1974).
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statutory provisions. Under this approach, the controlling person
provisions are considered to be one of several potential vehicles for
the imposition of secondary liability; their use is restricted to situa-
tions in which the common law theories of agency and aiding and
abetting are untenable. Instead of serving as a vehicle for all secu-
rities prosecutions, the provisions are available to reach particular
lines or methods of control otherwise inaccessible to plaintiffs.
The nonexclusivity view of the controlling person provisions
was adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1967.
In an amicus brief filed in Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen & Co.,'
12
the SEC argued that the controlling person provisions were inap-
plicable to conventional employment situations in which the law of
agency 13 would ordinarily impose liability upon a responsible
principal:
We submit . . . that the controlling-persons pro-
visions under which the court analyzed the federal aspect
of petitioner's claim are essentially irrelevant in the ordi-
nary employer-employee context, as exists in this case.
These provisions were designed to reach situations in which
there are technical legal barriers between the persons in
fact responsible for violations of the securities acts and
those injured by the violations. . . . [T]he controlling-
persons provisions were designed to avoid those barriers by,
for example, piercing the corporate veil to reach control-
ling stockholders. They were intended to enlarge, not
restrict, the scope of vicarious liability otherwise arising
under the securities acts. Hence, the exceptions set forth
in those provisions are applicable only when it is necessary
to invoke these expanded premises of liability. Conversely,
they are not applicable here because respondents' liability
may be and should be determined directly under the anti-
fraud provisions themselves. 4
Despite general recognition that the controlling person pro-
visions are essentially fashioned for use in situations where the facts
pose a barrier to traditional approaches, the statutory provisions
12390 U.S. 942 (1968).
13 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 257 (1958): "A principal is
subject to liability for loss caused to another by the other's reliance upon a tortious
representation of a servant or other agent, if the representation is: (a) authorized;
(b) apparently authorized; or (c) within the power of the agent to make for the
principal."
14 Brief for SEC as amicus curiae, Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen & Co.,
390 U.S. 942, cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968), quoted in Ruder, supra note
11, at 607.
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have repeatedly been used to reach classic employment relation-
ships.15 Moreover, the potential sufficiency of section 20(b) of the
1934 Act as a vehicle to serve the rule of respondeat superior has
apparently been ignored. That subsection states: "It shall be un-
lawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do any act or thing
which it would be unlawful for such person to do under the pro-
visions of this tide or any rule or regulation thereunder through or
by means of any other person." 16 This failure to apply the prin-
ciple of nonexclusivity in practice has significantly affected the
disposition of securities actions in two ways. First, the special de-
fenses of the controlling person provisions have been made poten-
tally available to defendants when strict agency-based liability
should be applied. Second, the case law involving control relation-
ships has been flawed and distorted because of the misapplication of
the statutory provisions. As will be discussed,1' both of these de-
velopments have obscured the intended congressional rationale for
controlling person liability in general.
III. THE Two-STEP ANALYTICAL MODEL: STATUS AND LIABILITY
The primary cause of analytical disorder in this area of secu-
rities law is the persistent confusion of the two distinct conditions
required for a finding of controlling person liability: (1) that the
defendant is a controlling person in relation to the primary violator,
and (2) that none of the special defenses supplied by the statutory
provisions apply to the facts of the case. These elements will be
referred to as the status issue and the liability issue, respectively.
A. Status
In the status phase of controlling person analysis, the inquiry
focuses upon the potential for the exercise of control or influence.
Proof of the actual use of this control is not required to establish
secondary liability under the provisions. Instead, the illegal exer-
cise of control is presumed when the exculpatory langnage is not
shown to apply to the transaction in question.
As suggested by the statutory language and its supporting regu-
lations and legislative history,"" the concept of "control" underlying
'5 See, e.g., Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1025 (1975) (publisher-employer held to be controlling person as to
author of financial column). See also cases discussed in note 33 infra.
16 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (1970).
17 See text following note 94 infra.
18 See text accompanying notes 2-6 supra.
1352 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
this form of derivative liability is vaguely defined, and apparently
includes every conceivable mechanism or relationship capable of
serving as a conduit for control. Where the violator is a corporate
entity, the statutory language contemplates that the ownership of a
controlling equity interest may give rise to a control relationship. 9
Similarly, status as a director of a corporation has consistently been
held to involve the opportunity for "control" within the meaning
of the statutes.20 In these two contexts the "controlling person" is
presumably on notice and fully aware of his general status under
the securities laws. More troubling, however, are those situations
in which an individual or group is unexpectedly found to "control"
a violator. For example, creditors of a business enterprise may ef-
fectively control the entity's transactions in certain circumstances,
and thus might be held liable as controlling persons. 21
The potential for a myriad of factual patterns involving control
relationships precludes attempts meaningfully to catalogue or ana-
lyze the breadth of the controlling person provisions, as some com-
mentators 22 and courts have noted. In Klapmeier v. Telecheck
International, Inc.,23 the court explained the ambiguity and inter-
pretative problems of the status issue:
The issue of "control" is a complex fact question
which requires an examination of the relationships of the
various alleged "controlling persons" to the person or
entity which transacted the sale of securities alleged to have
violated the Act, an examination of which cannot be
limited to a cursory review of their proportionate equity
positions, employment or director status on the relevant
dates. While a majority shareholder might as a matter of
law be held to "control" the entity regardless of his actual
participation in management decisions and the specific
transaction in question, the absence of a substantial owner-
19 See, e.g., Sommer, Who's "In Control"?-SEC, 21 Bus. LAw. 559, 563
(1966).
20 See, e.g., Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975);
Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd per curiam,
422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970). One court has even suggested that director status
is an essential element for controlling person status. Holloway v. Howerdd, 377
F. Supp. 754, 761 (M.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976).
21 See, e.g., Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper
Interference with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAw.
343 (1975).
22 See Sommer, supra note 19, at 559-83. See also Enstam & Kamen, Control
and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus. LAw. 289, 319-20 (1968).
23 315 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Minn. 1970).
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ship of shares does not foreclose liability under the Act as
a "controlling person." 24
Although this commentary recognizes the subtleties involved in de-
termining controlling person status and suggests the characteristics
of an insufficient judicial inquiry, it fails to articulate specific criteria
for resolving the status issue in particular cases. The factual nature
of the status issue has effectively prevented the development of uni-
versal standards.
B. Liability
The second phase of an action based upon the controlling
person provisions focuses upon the exculpatory clauses in the legisla-
tion. The exculpatory language in section 15 of the 1933 Act,
supplied by a special amendment in the 1934 Act,25 shields a "con-
trolling person" from liability where he or she "had no knowledge
of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by
reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to
exist." 26 The effect of this language is to require awareness of the
violation as a precondition to a finding of vicarious liability, except
where ignorance is due to a failure to carry out a reasonable duty
of inquiry.
Depending upon the identity of the alleged controlling person,
this liability standard operates to penalize a supervisory lapse, but it
does not impose an affirmative duty to supervise where none other-
wise exists. The "reasonable grounds to believe" language may,
however, create a duty to inquire when the controlling person
actually receives evidence of a violation. This concept is distin-'
guishable from the general notion of "constructive knowledge,"
under which information may be imputed to a person possessing no
substantive knowledge of the matter whatever.
2 7
The defenses available under the 1934 Act provision provide a
broader avenue of escape for the controlling person. A "controlling
24 Id. 1361.
25 Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 208, 48 Stat 908 (amending Securities Act
of 1933, ch. 38, § 15, 48 Stat. 84).
26 Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970).
27 The distinction between what may be called "actual possession" of reasonable
grounds to believe on the one hand, and an affirmative duty to investigate on the
other, is made elsewhere in the Securities Act. Compare Securities Act of 1933,
§§11(b)(3)(A) & (B), 15 U.S.C. §§77k(b)(3)(A) & (B) (1970) ("had, after
reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe") (emphasis
supplied), with Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11(b)(3)(C) & (D), 15 U.S.C. §§77k
(b)(3)(C) & (D) (1970) ("had no reasonable ground to believe and did not
believe").
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person" is protected therein if he "acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation
or cause of action." 28 The meaning of "good faith" in this context
is arguably analogous to the standard embodied in the 1933 Act
exculpatory clause. The term shields a controlling person in the
absence of actual knowledge of a violation, but it also provides a
defense when the controlling person should know of the violation
but does not, at least when such ignorance is not due to an inten-
tional failure to investigate.
The second element of the section 20(a) exculpatory test-the
requirement that the alleged controlling person must not have
directly or indirectly "induced" the violation-is difficult to construe.
Moreover, the rationale supporting the addition of this standard to
the good faith element is open to question. One reasonable inter-
pretation of this clause is that the language is addressed to two
special situations: (1) transactions in which a controlling person af-
firmatively acts to cause a violation without knowledge that the act
would constitute an offense, and (2) circumstances in which a con-
trolling person acts in good faith but fails to carry out a duty of
inquiry of which he was unaware, where such failure directly or
indirectly causes the offense. In these instances the statutes imposes
legal responsibility despite "good faith," because ignorance of the
law is an insufficient justification.
The important practical question, however, relates to the degree
of action required to support a finding of direct or indirect "induce-
ment." If a board of directors hires a managing official who sub-
sequently violates the securities laws, is their act an indirect induce-
ment of the offense? More fundamentally, does the term
"inducement" strictly require an affirmative act? Is a controlling
person's failure to provide adequate supervision actionable as a
direct or indirect inducement of a violation? The case law on this
point is divided, and depends heavily on the facts of each action,
but it is clear that some courts do not consider affirmative causal
actions essential for the imposition of vicarious liability.2 9
The language and statutory standards of liability of these pro-
visions demonstrate that controlling persons are a special class under
the securities laws, subject to substantial scrutiny. If an accused
individual occupies a control position in relation to the primary
28 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970).
29 See, e.g., discussion of Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968), and subsequent cases in text accompanying notes
62-67 infra. For a criticism of these holdings as being based upon erroneous appli-
cation of the controlling person provisions in agency situations, see text accompany-
ing notes 68-72 infra.
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violator and is unable to demonstrate the applicability of the ex-
culpatory clauses, the courts will impose statutory liability, exposing
the accused to adverse financial consequences and damage to per-
sonal reputation.
IV. THE CASE LAW: DISTINCTIONs LOST
As previously noted,80 a theoretical understanding of the con-
trolling person provisions has been hampered by questionable judi-
cial interpretation. This section will survey several existing prob-
lems in the area of secondary liability in order to identify important
distinctions disregarded by the courts and provide a basis for sug-
gesting a new perception and rationale for the controlling person
provisions. The problems discussed include: (1) the unspecified
scope of the control required for the imposition of controlling person
status, (2) the finding of "inducement" under the 1934 Act in the
absence of a clear affirmative act, (3) the misreading of the opinion
in Myzel v. Fields,31 and the use of its language to extend controlling
person status to tenuous relationships, and (4) the confusing nature
of the case law in this area, as exemplified by the opinion in Stern
v. American Bankshares Corp.82
A. The Status Issue: Scope of Control Required
An understanding of the status phase of controlling person
analysis necessitates specification of the types of control relationships
subject to the provisions. The provisions clearly require control of
the violator, but the extent or comprehensiveness of the necessary
control may vary.
Assuming that every "violator" is a natural person, three pos-
sible standards of controlling person status can be formulated. The
first possible status test would require the alleged controlling person
to have the potential for control of the violator in all phases of the
violator's business activities, as is the case in many of the agency-type
situations handled under the controlling person provisions. 3s The
30 See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
31386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
32429 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
33 See, e.g., Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971) (corpora-
tion held to be a controlling person, sharing liability for violations committed by
persons it hired to organize business in another state, because it had the "influence
to control, direct or discipline" those persons "with regard to those dealings." Id.
42). See also SEC v. First Securities Co. of Chicago, 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. McKy v. Hoctfelder, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal.), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d
1202 (9th Cir. 1968).
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second possible status test would demand a showing of potential
control over the violator only in the types of business activities that
are capable of producing a violation such as the one at issue. The
third possible status requirement would be satisfied by a demon-
stration of the potential for control over the violator in the specific
transaction or transactions underlying the allegation of primary
liability.
The required scope of control over the violator is equally un-
clear in situations involving a violator who is the agent of a business
entity. Under these circumstances, the business entity theoretically
becomes a primary violator as well, focusing the status inquiry upon
persons exercising control over the business entity. If the scrutinized
individuals potentially control the entity's entire business activity
via conventional methods such as director status or "controlling"
equity interests, the inquiry is easily resolved. A showing of personal
ownership of controlling equity interests may be treated as virtually
conclusive evidence of control over the entity in which the beneficial
interest is held.34 Similatly, director status is considered a strong
indication of the potential for control and influence, although it is
not sufficient in itself to demonstrate controlling person status.3 5
Rules of this type are not always, however, available to the courts.
Instead, the courts are often faced with individuals possessing vary-
ing degress of control over the business entity. This raises three
questions: (1) Is full "entity control"-in the sense that a majority
shareholder controls a corporation-required in order to demonstrate
controlling person status? (2) Is control of an entity's securities issues
sufficient? and (3) Is the potential for control over the particular
transactions giving rise to the violation sufficient?
These fundamental questions have not been convincingly an-
swered by the case law. Opinions vacillate as to the comprehensive-
ness of the potential control required by an appropriate status test.
In the absence of a clear judicial exposition, an attempt to deduce
or infer guiding principles must focus upon results reached in
4 See, e.g., language quoted in text accompanying note 24 supra, from
Klapmeier v. Telecheck Int'l, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Minn. 1970). See also
Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975); Sommer, supra note
19, at 562-76. This conclusion seems required by the statutory language.
35 See, e.g., Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269, 275-76
(10th Cir. 1957). But see Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y.
1969), aff'd per curiam, 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970) (directors ipso facto con-
trolling persons). Cf. Holloway v. Howerdd, 377 F. Supp. 754, 761 (M.D. Tenn.
1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976)
(person charged with control must occupy, at a minimum, a director's position at
times material to the litigation and actively participate in the corporation's opera-
tion).
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particular fact situations. In Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Beane,36 the court found a control relationship in the
absence of structural control or influence. The violator was tech-
nically not an employee of the brokerage firm; instead, he was a
"correspondent" or "wire connection" who made arrangements for
transactions subsequently executed by the firm. Merrill Lynch sup-
plied this "correspondent" with office space as well as supplies and
services of various kinds. In addition, the court noted, the firm
assumed the responsibility of confirming that transactions arranged
through correspondents were carried out in accordance with appli-
cable securities rules and regulations.
37
Despite the traditional employment characteristics of this re-
lationship and the absence of a discernible control structure, the
court held that Merrill Lynch was a controlling person in relation
to the violations of the correspondent. This result, however, does
not support the proposition that "affiliates" are generally liable for
offenses committed by those with whom they deal. Merrill Lynch's
scope of control was sufficient in this case because the partnership's
pattern of supervision gave it potential control over the violator in
certain types of business activities capable of producing a violation.
Moreover, the firm's control over its correspondent's accounts pro-
vided it with the ability to influence the violator's conduct and
prevent fraud in this particular case. Merrill Lynch could have
forestalled the violative transaction by closing the correspondent's
omnibus account3s which allowed him to place orders for undis-
closed customers and convert their funds.
Another example of judicial willingness to extend control status
to a relationship in which the controlling person had less than full
entity control was the decision in DeMarco v. Edens.39 In this case,
the lower court held that a control relationship was created because
the issuer influenced the best efforts underwriter via selection of that
underwriter and control over the terms of the offering.40 The
affirming opinion, however, substantially undercut this result. After
noting that the defendant was shielded from liability under the
exculpatory clauses of sections 12 and 15 of the 1933 Act, the Second
Circuit commented in dictum that "[w]e harbor serious doubts
36 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
37 Id. 110-20.
38 Id. 122-24.
39 [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] Fau. SEc. L. Bzn. (CCH) it 91,856 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), af'd, 390 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968).
40 Id. 95,934. See also discussion of this case by Professor Loss at 6 Loss,
SEcunrrEs REcULATION 3931 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
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about the district court's conclusion that appellees were . 'con-
trolling persons' within the meaning of the statute." 41
One recent case, Ferland v. Orange Groves of Florida, Inc.,42
may reinforce the notion that the status requirement may be satis-
fied by a showing of potential control over certain portions of the
entity's business activities, or over only the transaction in question.
In Ferland the court found that three corporations under the com-
mon control and direction of a single group of individuals 43 had
made material misrepresentations concerning the investment poten-
tial of certain orange groves.44 Examining five potentially liable
defendants, the court excluded two from the controlling person class
and found controlling person status in the cases of three others.45
The court reasoned that two of the defendants lacked "the ability,
in fact or in law, to control the activities of the Selling Corporations
in relation to the latter's own customers." 46 In contrast, the court
found the three other defendants to be controlling persons because
they "had the ability and the right to control the liability producing
activities of the Selling Corporations." 47 This second standard may
represent judicial acceptance of something less than entity control,
depending upon how the language is read. The phrase "the liability
producing activities" may mean either of two things. It could be
that the crucial factor in the court's analysis of the status issue, as in
a strict "transaction control" approach, is control over those activities
which produced the violation in question. A second plausible inter-
pretation is that the three defendants were controlling persons be-
cause of their "ability and right" to control all of the potentially
liability-producing activities of the corporate entity.
The Ferland opinion contains another observation germane to
the determination of controlling person status, although it also re-
lates to the liability issue. In a statement possibly addressed to the
principles of vicarious liability in general, the court commented that
[f]or purposes of attaching liability under either [control-
ling person] provision in a manner consistent with due
process, the person sought to be held liable for the conduct
of another must be shown to have had the lawful authority
41390 F.2d 836, 841 (footnote omitted). The appellate opinion specifically
noted that it did not reach the status issue. Id.
42 377 F. Supp. 690 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
43 Id. 693.
44Id. 701-02.
45Id. 707.
46Id.
47 Id.
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to control or influence that conduct in such a way as to
have been able to avoid liability.
48
This language is apparently intended to state a condition necessary,
but not conclusive, for the finding of controlling person status.
Moreover, it suggests that the inability of an alleged controlling
person to exercise transaction control precludes such status.
This discussion of the scope of control illustrates the varying
standards applied to the status issue by the courts. Although desig-
nations of controlling person status often include a finding of com-
plete control over the individual violator or corporate entity, it is
unclear at this point whether such entity control is a strict require-
ment. The difficulty of this question has been compounded by the
reluctance of most courts to address the status issue either distinctly
or comprehensively.
B. The Liability Issue: "Inducement" Under the
Exchange Act Provision
The "inducement" language within the exculpatory clauses of
the 1934 Act is a continual source of concern in controlling person
cases. Its interpretation is critical to the determination of the
boundaries of liability under the Act.49 If the term "inducement"
is given a broad interpretation by the courts, some controlling per-
sons would theoretically be unable to avoid liability despite justi-
fiable ignorance or lack of involvement in a violation, a result which
is not supported by the policy or the legislative history of the
securities acts. Congress explicitly expressed the intention to im-
pose affirmative duties in other sections of the acts; 50 it could have
done the same in this case by limiting the exculpatory clause of
section 20 to situations in which the defendant had reasonable
grounds to believe that there was no illegal conduct, or fulfilled a
reasonable duty of supervision or investigation.
An examination of the case law indicates that there is no con-
sensus regarding the necessity of an affirmative act to satisfy the
inducement language. One line of cases clearly requires an affirma-
tive act or personal involvement as a precondition to vicarious lia-
48 Id., citing Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1973).
49 The "reasonable grounds to believe" language of section 15 of the 1933 Act
and the "good faith" language of section 20(a) of the 1934 Act are also crucial to
the interpretation of the securities acts. The survey of the exculpatory clauses will
focus on the "inducement" language because the other two clauses are such com-
plete questions of fact as to preclude effective theoretical analysis.
5o See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
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bility. In Lanza v. Drexel & Co.51 the Second Circuit viewed section
20 as a reflection of Congress' intent to impose liability only upon
those controlling persons "who are in some meaningful sense cul-
pable participants in the fraud perpetrated by controlled persons." 52
This formulation was again applied by that court in Gordon v.
Burr,58 and apparently was followed by the Third Circuit in Rochez
Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades.54 In Rochez Bros., the court commented
that "[t]he legislative history of Section 20(a) illustrates that Con-.
gress intended liability to be based on something besides control.
That something is culpable participation." 55 The opinion also
stated that liability may be based on inaction only when the failure
to act "intentionally furthered the fraud or prevented its dis-
covery." 56
The Ninth Circuit in Zweig v. Hearst Corp.5 7 agreed that "in-
ducement" was associated with active involvement in the events
giving rise to a violation. The court held that a controlling person
must show that he or she "did not directly or indirectly participate
in the wrongful acts" in order to fall within the exculpatory clause.
58
The opinion stressed, however, that a publisher identified as the
controlling person should not be held to a standard of care as high
as that of a broker-dealer.5 9 A test "amounting more nearly to cul-
pability" was, therefore, appropriate. 60 Using this distinction, less
of an affirmative act, if any at all, would be required for the estab-
lishment of liability in the case of one accustomed to dealing in the
securities markets on a regular basis.
Other courts are willing to find vicarious liability in the absence
of affirmative acts or culpable involvement in the violation. The
standard applied in these cases is analogous to the strict liability
approach to secondary liability found in common law agency cases,
and may be based on the view that the minimum requirements of
51479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
52 Id. 1299 (emphasis added).
53 506 F.2d 1080, 1085 (2d Cir. 1974).
54527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975).
55 Id. 884-85.
56 Id. 890 (emphasis added).
57521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
58 Id. 1132 (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit may concur in this view.
See Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32, 39-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 926 (1973), in which the court refused to find liability based on trans-
actions carried out by a former associate of a brokerage house because of a lack of
suffcient "involvement."
59 521 F.2d at 1135.
60 Id.
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due process 61 should be the sole restraints in attaching vicarious
liability. One important example of this interpretation of induce-
ment is the Eighth Circuit's decision in Myzel v. Fields.62  The
Myzel court stated that the 1984 controlling person statute "is
remedial and is to be construed liberally. It has been interpreted
as requiring only some indirect means of discipline or influence
short of actual direction to hold a 'controlling person' liable." 63
As will be noted,61 the sentence reproduced here has frequently been
misread as support for a loose interpretation of controlling person
status. A careful in-context analysis of the passage indicates, how-
ever, that the Eighth Circuit was addressing the liability issue rather
than the question of status.65 The court indicated through this
statement that once controlling person status is established, the
showing of an indirect means of discipline or influence at the time
of the violation is sufficient for the imposition of liability.
In Carr v. New York Stock Exchange,66 the court suggested that
section 20 liability does not require an affirmative act. Rejecting a
claim that a national securities exchange is a controlling person as
to member firms, the Carr court noted that as a controlling person
the exchange would theoretically be liable whether it "took positive
actions in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, or merely failed to
prevent a fraudulent scheme on the part of its member firms. Under
§ 20(a) mere good faith or lack of knowledge of the scheme is not
enough to avoid liability." 67
The concept of inducement accepted by the Myzel and Carr
courts has been utilized to impose liability in two cases: Hawkins v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane,68 and Lorenz v. Watson.
69
Both of these cases, however, are questionable authority for the
general use of a loose inducement standard for two reasons: (1) the
alleged controlling persons were brokerage houses with an estab-
lished duty to supervise their employees, apart from any special
responsibilities created by the controlling person provisions (in
Lorenz the brokerage house was held liable for its salesman's "churn-
ing" because its failure to take precautionary steps to supervise its
61 See, e.g., text accompanying note 48 supra.
62386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
631d. 738 (citations omitted).
64 See text accompanying notes 73-87 infra.
65 386 F.2d at 738-39.
66414 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
67 Id. 1303.
68 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
69 258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
1362 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
employees was regarded as participation in the violation; 70 similarly,
the Hawkins court imposed liability because Merrill Lynch had
tolerated a distinctive account arrangement with the potential for
abuse 71); and (2) the clear agency setting of the cases may under-
mine their authority on this point in light of the nonexclusivity
argument 72 that the controlling person provisions are inappropriate
in such circumstances.
C. The Myzel Formulation: Source of Continuing Confusion
The Eighth Circuit's comment in Myzel v. Fields73 regarding
the scope and interpretation of the controlling person provision in
the 1934 Act has become a benchmark to which the courts have
frequently reverted. Its repetition here is worthwhile for purposes
of comparison. "The [1934] statute is remedial and is to be con-
strued liberally. It has been interpreted as requiring only some in-
direct means of discipline or influence short of actual direction to
hold a 'controlling person' liable." 74 As the preceding analysis
has suggested,75 the accuracy of the second sentence as a proposition
of law is questionable, at least when the controlling person pro-
visions are removed from the agency context. Even if its accuracy
were clear, however, the Myzel court's analysis of the question of
liability has been substantially compromised by subsequent misinter-
pretations in opinions attempting to apply this language as a test
for controlling person status. 78
In Harriman v. E.I. duPont De Nemours & Co.7 7 the Myzel
language was misquoted, the court's opinion omitting the final
phrase of the second sentence without indication of its removal:
"The statute is remedial and is to be construed liberally. It has
been interpreted as requiring only some indirect means of discipline
or influence short of actual direction." 78 Using this formulation,
the Harriman court read the language as a loose standard for con-
trolling person status. If this approach were universally adopted,
70 Id. 733.
71 See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
72 See text accompanying notes 12-17 supra.
73386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967).
74Id. 738 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the omitted citations, see
text accompanying notes 68-72 supra.
75 See text accompanying notes 61-72 supra.
76The misinterpretation of the Myzel inducement language has previously been
recognized. See Comment, supra note 11, at 634 n.73, 637 n.83 (criticism of the
Anderson and Richardson courts' use of the language as a test of control).
77372 F. Supp. 101 (D. Del. 1974).
78Id. 105 (citations omitted).
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control relationships could be found in an endless array of circum-
stances without regard to the reasonable expectations of the alleged
controlling person.
Unfortunately, Harriman is not the only example of misuse of
the Myzel statement. In Moerman v. Zipco, Inc.,79 the court, in the
course of declaring directors to be ipso facto controlling persons,
referred to "the liberal construction of this section as including 'in-
direct means of discipline or influence short of actual direction,'"
citing Myzel.80 In Anderson v. Francis L duPont & Co.,81 the court
found that two brokerage houses had the potential for control of a
commodities dealer by using this quotation to support "a broad
construction of the term 'controlling persons.' "12 Similarly, the
court in Richardson v. MacArthur s3 erroneously applied the Myzel
language as a test for status. Because "it cannot now be claimed that
Bonneville lacked the influence to control, direct, or discipline
MacArthur with regard to those dealings," 84 the court held that
controlling person status had been established."5
Perhaps the clearest misreading of the Myzel approach is evi-
denced in McGraw v. Matthaei.8 6 There the court commented:
It is true that in order to establish control within the
meaning of § 20(a), it is not necessary to establish a strict
agency relationship. Rather, it is only necessary to show
some indirect means of discipline or influence to find that
a person is a controlling person within the meaning of the
Section.8 7
Even though the McGraw court did not hesitate to reject the tenu-
ous allegation of control presented by the defendant's counterclaim,
the recurrent misreading and adoption of the Myzel language as a
test for controlling person status is a serious problem for two reasons:
(1) judicial interpretation of this type only complicates the confused
case law applying the controlling person provisions, and (2) the
stakes are extremely high in terms of dollars and reputation for the
individual or entity mistakenly found to be a controlling person.
79 302 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir.
1970).
80 302 F. Supp. at 447.
81291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968).
82 Id. 710.
83 451 F.2d 35 (1oth Cir. 1971).
84 Id. 42 (footnote omitted).
85 Id.
86 388 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
87 Id. 93 (citing Myzel).
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Nevertheless, careful scrutiny and discussion of this issue in forth-
coming opinions can easily remedy the error.
D. Stern v. American Bankshares Corp.: A Distress Signal
A recent case in which a court was asked to rule upon the
sufficiency of a complaint under the controlling person provisions
exemplifies the potential for confusion in this area of the law. In
Stern v. American Bankshares Corp.,s8 the court was unreasonably
imprecise in its analysis of the standards to be applied in determin-
ing the sufficiency of a complaint or in ruling on the merits of an
action. First, the Stern court stated that a complaint need not allege
the exercise of control over the transaction giving rise to the viola-
tion.89 This proposition was supported with quotations from the
opinion in Holloway v. Howerdd:
The court accepts as settled law the proposition that
directors of a corporation may be found liable as control-
ling persons, both under the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act, even without actively participating in the con-
duct upon which liability is founded. (Citations omitted)
Nevertheless, a director's liability, pretermitting the
good faith defense of § 78t, presupposes some extent of
actual participation in the corporation's operation before
the consequences of control may be imposed.90
The use of the Holloway language was improper, because that
language had been addressed to a liability issue rather than to a
status question. In addition to the explicit use of the word "lia-
bility," note the reference to "the consequences of control" rather
than the fact of control itself. Moreover, the standards used in cases
involving the liability of a director alleged to be a controlling person
are poor precedent for determining the liability of individuals lack-
ing director status.
88429 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
89 Id. 823.
90429 F. Supp. at 823-24 (quoting Holloway v. Howerdd, 377 F. Supp. 754,
761 (M.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 536 F.2d
690 (6th Cir. 1976). The authority used by the Holloway court was Moerman v.
Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1969)) (emphasis by the court).
The citations omitted by the Stern court referred to Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F.
Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane,
85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
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Another example of the Stern court's imprecision appeared in
its discussion of the standards utilized to prove the merits of an
action. The court remarked:
What the plaintiff in this action must establish is that
those persons whom he contends are controlling persons
have actively participated in the operations of Bankshares
and possessed actual control over the transaction in ques-
tion. Once that is established the matters of knowledge
and actual participation, which directly or indirectly in-
duced the fraud, are matters for the defenseP1
This passage essentially asserts that two elements must be demon-
strated in order to establish controlling person status: the first is
some amount of participation in the operations of the entity alleged
to be "controlled"; the second is possession of actual control over
the violative transaction.
Both of these elements are subject to criticism. The inclusion
of a participation requirement is misguided because the need for a
controlling person's participation in the violation 9 2 relates to the
liability issue instead of the status issue; the Stern court lost this
distinction when it improperly adapted the Holloway language.
Similarly, the actual control test is unnecessarily misleading. Taken
literally, the phrase suggests that liability will only be imposed when
the defendant affirmatively exercises control over the primary vio-
lator's actions. But when the opinion is closely scrutinized, it is
apparent that the court intended to distinguish between the posses-
sion and exercise of actual control. As a result, the second prong
of the Stern test in reality requires the defendant to possess the
potential for involvement in, or control over, the transaction in
question. The availability of a logical interpretation does not, how-
ever, alleviate the difficulty in separating status phase analysis of
"actual control" and the determination of "actual involvement or
participation" during litigation of the liability issue.
V. CONCLUSION
The controlling person provisions reflect Congress' desire to
place responsibility for securities violations upon those persons who
directed or influenced the violators. These laws were designed to
cut through formal legal insulation and impose liability upon in-
91429 F. Supp. at 824.
92 The Stern court's formulation may reflect the concern in Holloway that an
outside director could be held liable for violations arising from matters which he
or she had no knowledge of or control over.
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dividuals whose power and influence were believed to enable them
to select and control potential violators of the Acts.
Where a principal-agent relationship exists, there is no need to
invoke these provisions and extend their special defenses to alleged
violators.93 Moreover, the controlling person provisions are prob-
ably best viewed as having been addressed to a special case of the
"indirect violation" described in section 20(b) of the 1934 Act.94
Under this view, the demonstration of a control relationship would
establish a prima facie violation of section 20(b) through the use of
intermediaries, and would shift the focus of analysis to the control-
ling person sections, where the burden is upon the defendant to
establish the applicability of exculpatory language. By viewing
controlling person liability as a subset of the general liability of
those who accomplish violations through others, courts may gain a
perspective on the provisions that will help prevent hasty findings
of controlling person status and liability.
A finding of controlling person status has a dramatic effect upon
a defendant in a securities action because he must thereafter
shoulder the burden of establishing a defense. In recognition of
this fact, courts should carefully scrutinize allegations of control and
remove the controlling person sections from the context of agency.
If it is remembered that the conceptual basis for imposing liability
is to punish those who violate through others rather than to rein-
force a pre-existing duty to supervise, much confusion in the status
phase of controlling person analysis can be eliminated and better
decisions produced.
With regard to the liability issue, it appears that when the cases
applying the provisions to agency relationships are set aside, a re-
quirement of an affirmative act in furtherance of the violation
emerges as a condition for the requisite "inducement" under the
1934 Act provision. (One possible exception to this rule is the case
of inaction intended to further an illegal scheme by delaying its
discovery.) The need for this standard becomes increasingly evident
when the "duty to supervise" rationale is properly rejected.
This Comment has argued that the complex nature of control-
ling person liability and the prevalence and severity of confusion in
judicial analysis necessitate a clarification and reexamination of
existing standards. Several steps can be taken to facilitate this
process. First, the controlling person provisions should be removed
from the agency context; they are not vehicles for the imposition of
93 See text accompanying notes 12-17 supra.
94 Id.
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strict liability on principals and supervisors who cannot establish a
reasonable defense; common law theories are available to accomplish
this result. Second, the two issues of status and liability should be
kept separate and distinct in both theory and application, despite
the frequency of their intermingling in the case law to date, and the
difficulty in identifying instances of their confusion. Third, a re-
quirement of an affirmative act or a failure to act intended to further
a violation should be acknowledged by courts interpreting section
20(a). Fourth, the "indirect violation" rationale of the controlling
person provisions should be recognized and used as a guide to statu-
tory interpretation. If it is agreed that these sections are designed
to reach a special class of persons who violate the Acts through
others, courts will be able to take a consistent and more accurate
approach to the issues of controlling person status and liability.
The greater predictability that will result from an effort to improve
controlling person analysis will make more effective securities regu-
lation possible.
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